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ABSTRACT
Corruption and shadow economy are two critical problems which
feed each other and pose an obstacle against the economic
development of countries, especially those with weak fundamen-
tals. Central and Eastern European countries have experienced an
absolute political and economic transformation after the downfall
of the Berlin Wall. This study researches the effect of corruption
and rule of law on shadow economy in 11 transition economies
of Central and Eastern Europe over the 2003–2015 term with
panel cointegration and causality tests considering heterogeneity
and cross-sectional dependence. The cointegration coefficients
revealed a complementary interplay between size of shadow
economy and corruption. Furthermore, the causality analysis indi-
cated that there was a bilateral causality between control of cor-
ruption and shadow economy in all the cross-section units.
However, there was a two-way causality between rule of law and
shadow economy only in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and
Romania. Furthermore, there was one-way causality from rule of
law to shadow economy in Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia
and Slovenia.
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1. Introduction
Both corruption and shadow economy are common problems which all countries
face in several dimensions, and they have social, economic and political implications.
Corruption is generally expressed as the misuse of public or private office for individ-
ual gain and consists of bribery, embezzlement, nepotism or confiscation. Thus, the
existence of corruption causes the inefficient allocation or waste of public resources,
increases the cost of doing business, increases income inequality and poverty, weak-
ens the institutional and legal structure of the state and tax system, and erodes the
public trust for the state (OECD, 2014). On the other side, the shadow economy is
expressed as the unrecorded economic activities which make contribution to the gross
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domestic product due to avoidance of taxation or regulations (Schneider & Enste, 2000).
The informality has become a key point for the problems of both government and private
sectors and the analysis of the possible solutions to the problems. The shadow economy
makes economic and social policy planning difficult because of incomplete and unreliable
statistics. Decreases in the tax revenues and the size of the shadow economy may increase
if the government raises tax rates to meet decreasing tax incomes. Furthermore, increases
in the size of the shadow economy can direct the economic units to go underground
(Schneider & Enste, 2000; Singh, Jain-Chandra, & Mohommad, 2012).
The interaction between corruption and shadow economy has been a much dis-
cussed topic in the relevant literature. Some researchers see corruption as a compo-
nent of the shadow economy (e.g., Tanzi, 1998), whereas some researchers assert that
corruption is not a component of the shadow economy (e.g., Altug, 1994; Onder,
2001). However, both the shadow economy and corruption may decrease social wel-
fare. Furthermore, the shadow economy and corruption may exhibit a complementary
or substitutable relationship. On one hand, the shadow economy and corruption can
be substitutes, because increasing the size of the shadow economy decreases the ten-
dency of state employees to ask for bribes (Dreher & Schneider, 2006). On the other
hand, the shadow economy and corruption may be complementary, because corrup-
tion can be regarded as a form of regulation and taxation (Johnson, Kaufmann, &
Zoido-Lobaton, 1998a) and taxpayers pay a bribe to the officials in exchange for
underspecifying the tax liability (Hindriks, Muthoo, & Keen, 1999). So, the interac-
tion between the shadow economy and corruption has remained inconclusive theoret-
ically, and a two-way causality is expected between shadow economy and corruption.
The transition economies of Central and Eastern European Union (CEEU) imple-
mented a transition to the liberal market economies from centrally planned econo-
mies towards the end of the 1980s. CEEU countries had an economic and
institutional conversion along with the contribution of European Union membership
process until today. The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of corruption
and rule of law on the shadow economy in CEEU countries within the recent trans-
formation process. In the relevant literature, relatively few studies have concentrated
on the impact of corruption on the size of the shadow economy and generally used
regression analysis. So this paper will aim at contributing to the relevant literature in
three ways. First, it will contribute to the limited literature. Second, it will be one of
the early studies investigating the corruption–shadow economy nexus for the sample
of CEEU countries. Third, the study will use second-generation econometric tests
considering the cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity among the variables.
The remaining part of the study is structured as follows. The next part of the
article summarises the relevant literature and Section 3 presents data and method.
Then, econometric analysis and major inferences are shown in Section 4 and Section
5 concludes the study.
2. Literature review
Theoretically, there exists a mutual interaction between corruption and shadow econ-
omy. The relationship can be in a substitutable form in the case where the existence
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of a shadow economy decreases the tendency of state employees to ask for bribes
(Dreher & Schneider, 2006). On the other hand, the relationship can be in a comple-
mentary form when corruption can be regarded as a form of regulation and taxation
(Johnson et al., 1998a) and taxpayers pay a bribe to the officials in exchange for
underspecifying the tax liability (Hindriks et al., 1999). Therefore, a bilateral interac-
tion is expected between shadow economy and corruption in theory.
A great number of scholars have researched the determinants and economic effects
of corruption and shadow economy. However, the mutual effect between shadow
economy and corruption has stayed relatively untouched considering the relevant lit-
erature. The limited number of studies have reached mixed findings, but most of the
empirical studies revealed a complementarity between corruption and shadow econ-
omy (e.g., see Albulescu, Tamisila, & Taucean, 2016; Buehn & Schneider, 2009;
Johnson et al., 1998a, 1998b; Manolas, Rontos, Sfakianakis, & Vavouras, 2013;
Schneider, 2007; Shahab, Pajooyan, & Ghaffari, 2015; Virta, 2010).
Johnson et al. (1998a, 1998b) primarily analysed the relationship of the shadow
economy and corruption in countries from different parts of the world and discov-
ered that improvements in corruption decreased the shadow economy. Friedman,
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) researched the major causes underly-
ing shadow economy in a panel with 69 countries by regression analysis and revealed
corruption as a crucial determinant of shadow economy. Chowdhury (2005) also
researched the major causes underlying shadow economy in a panel of 96 countries
with regression analysis and discovered that corruption was a significant determinant
of shadow economy.
Schneider (2007) researched the interplay between shadow economy and corrup-
tion in 145 countries during the 1999–2003 period through regression analysis and
found that the shadow economy decreased corruption in high-income countries,
whereas it raised corruption in low-income countries. Buehn and Schneider (2009)
also investigated the interplay between shadow economy and corruption in 51 states
during the 2000–2005 period using a structural equation model and revealed a posi-
tive relationship between corruption and the shadow economy, but shadow economy
had a relatively higher effect on corruption given the effect of corruption on the
shadow economy. On the other hand, Virta (2010) analysed the interaction between
corruption and shadow economy with a panel of 79 and 95 cross-sections using panel
regression and revealed that corruption increased the shadow economy inside the
tropical region, but did not affect the shadow economy outside the tropical region.
In another study, Dreher and Schneider (2010) investigated the interplay between
shadow economy and corruption in 98 countries through data of the 2000–2002
period averages by using panel regression and discovered that shadow economy and
corruption were complementary in low-income countries. Manolas et al. (2013) also
researched the major determinants underlying shadow economy in 19 OECD coun-
tries over the period 2003–2008 with regression analysis and discovered that improve-
ments in the control of corruption negatively affected the shadow economy.
Vo, Ha and Ly (2015) researched the relation between shadow economy and cor-
ruption in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations during 1995–2014 and revealed
a complementarity between shadow economy and corruption; however, the
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corruption had a relatively higher effect on shadow economy against the effect of
shadow economy on the corruption. Shahab et al. (2015) analysed the interaction
between shadow economy and corruption in two groups of 25 countries from devel-
oped and developing countries during the 1999–2007 period using static and dynamic
panel regression and revealed that the relationship may exhibit complementarity or
substitutability depending on the corruption index.
Albulescu et al. (2016) analysed the effect of corruption, taxation and financial
stability on shadow economy with a panel of 23 OECD countries during the
2001–2013 period with dynamic regression and revealed that corruption positively
influenced the size of the shadow economy. Borlea, Achim and Miron (2017) investi-
gated the interaction between corruption and shadow economy in 28 EU countries
during 2005–2014 through regression analysis. They discovered that corruption
affected the shadow economy positively. Finally, Ouedraogo (2017) researched the
interaction among corruption, governance and shadow economy in 23 sub-Saharan
economies with regression analysis and revealed that corruption positively affected
the shadow economy.
3. Data and econometric methodology
We explored the cointegrating relationship and causality between corruption, rule of
law and shadow economy in 11 CEEU states over the 2003–2015 period with panel
cointegration and causality tests.
3.1. Data
In this study, we analysed the long-run and causal interaction among corruption, rule
of law and shadow economy. In this context, the data of shadow economy calculated
by Schneider (2015) with the MIMIC method was used as the dependent variable. On
the other hand, the data of rule of law and control of corruption were extracted from
world governance indicators from World Bank (2016). The values of both variables,
which vary from –2.5 to þ2.5, and increases in the indexes reflect the improvement
in corruption and rule of law (see Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2010) for detailed
information about the measurement of both variables) (Table 1).
The sample of the study consisted of 11 CEE states from EU (Bulgaria (BGR),
Croatia (HRV), Czech Republic (CZE), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HUN), Latvia
(LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Poland (POL), Romania (ROU), Slovakia (SVK) and
Slovenia (SVN)), considering the institutional and economic transformation of the
countries. The Gauss 11.0 and Stata 14.0 programs were benefited at the section of
empirical analysis.
Table 1. Data definition.
Variables Data Definition Source
SHAD Shadow economy (% of GDP) Schneider (2015)
COC Control of corruption World Bank (2016)
ROL Rule of law World Bank (2016)
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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Bulgaria had the largest shadow economy with 30.6% of GDP in 2015, while
Slovakia had the smallest shadow economy with 14.1% in 2015. However, all coun-
tries experienced improvements in the shadow economy as seen in Chart 1. In this
regard, Slovakia, Latvia and Czech Republic, respectively, made the largest improve-
ments in size of the shadow economy with 23.37, 22.37, and 22.56%. On the other
hand, Slovenia made the least improvement in size of shadow economy with 12.73%.
The descriptive statistics of the data set on a country basis and overall panel basis
are presented in Table 2. The characteristics indicated that the mean of the shadow
economy was 26.886%, the mean of control of corruption index was 0.2956 and the
mean of rule of law index was 0.5964. Furthermore, the size of the shadow economy
had the largest standard deviation, while the standard deviations of both control of
corruption and rule of law were relatively much smaller.
3.2. Econometric model and the hypotheses
Tax and regulatory burden, business and labour regulations, corruption, institutional
and legal quality and income inequality have been documented as the major determi-
nants of the shadow economy (Dell’anno, 2016; Gaspareniene, Remeikiene, &
Heikkila, 2016). In this study, we focused on the interaction between corruption, legal
quality and shadow economy. Therefore, the following model was established
SHAD ¼ f COC;ROLð Þ (1)
We expect that the improvements in both corruption and rule of law decrease the
size of the shadow economy considering the relevant theoretical and empirical litera-
ture and the sample. Therefore, the following hypotheses were established and investi-










2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015
BGRBGRHRVHRVCZE CZE EST EST HUNHUNLVALVALTU LTUPOL POLROUROUSVKSVKSVNSVN
Chart 1. Size of shadow economy (% of GDP). Source: Schneider, 2015.
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Hypothesis 1: A decrease in corruption reduces ceteris paribus the size of the
shadow economy.
Hypothesis 2: An improvement in rule of law reduces ceteris paribus the size of the
shadow economy.
3.3. Econometric methodology
At the first stage of econometric analysis, cross-sectional dependence and homogene-
ity were investigated to determine the tests of unit root, cointegration and causality.
Then Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS unit root test, the cointegration test by Westerlund and
Edgerton (2007) and the bootstrap causality test by Konya (2006) were selected to
analyse the long-run and causal interaction among corruption, rule of law and
shadow economy considering the presence of cross-sectional dependence and hetero-
geneity among the series.
In this context, the CDLM1 test of Breusch and Pagan (1980) and the LMadj test of
Pesaran, Ulla, and Yamagata (2008) were used to investigate the existence of cross-
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the data set.
Country Variables Mean Min. Max Standard deviation
Bulgaria SHAD 32.8077 30.6 35.9 1.63781
COC –0.18 –0.31 0.1 0.13583
ROL –0.1269 –0.19 –0.07 0.03301
Croatia SHAD 29.9846 27.7 32.3 1.52033
COC 0.0746 –0.1 0.2 0.10397
ROL 0.1331 –0.05 0.31 0.1057
Czech Republic SHAD 16.9769 15.1 19.5 1.42838
COC 0.3162 0.19 0.46 0.08272
ROL 0.9362 0.74 1.14 0.12018
Estonia SHAD 28.9538 26.2 30.8 1.37878
COC 0.9815 0.79 1.27 0.14559
ROL 1.1038 0.75 1.36 0.16439
Hungary SHAD 23.3077 21.6 25 1.11689
COC 0.3946 0.1 0.65 0.19203
ROL 0.7462 0.4 0.96 0.17751
Latvia SHAD 27.2077 23.6 30.4 2.06174
COC 0.2254 0.13 0.4 0.09198
ROL 0.7223 0.56 0.87 0.09825
Lithuania SHAD 29.3769 25.8 32 1.7763
COC 0.2546 0.03 0.56 0.16143
ROL 0.7215 0.49 0.98 0.13625
Poland SHAD 26.2889 25 27.7 0.98798
COC 0.2989 0.11 0.49 0.12917
ROL 0.5078 0.35 0.75 0.13854
Romania SHAD 30.1308 28.00 33.60 1.77313
COC –0.1985 –0.30 –0.05 0.06631
ROL –0.0200 –0.23 0.15 0.12878
Slovakia SHAD 16.3615 14.10 18.40 1.33575
COC 0.2538 0.06 0.49 0.13042
ROL 0.4900 0.33 0.57 0.06151
Slovenia SHAD 24.6308 23.10 26.70 1.23382
COC 0.8769 0.69 1.02 0.11636
ROL 0.9585 0.86 1.06 0.05914
Total SHAD 26.886 15.1 35.9 4.90648
COC 0.2956 –0.31 1.27 0.34214
ROL 0.5964 –0.19 1.36 0.41105
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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sectional dependence, because the time dimension of the data set was higher than the
cross-section of the data set. Then panel CIPS unit root test, a second-generation
panel unit root test, was preferred to examine the existence of unit root in the varia-
bles considering the cross-sectional dependence among the variables. The panel coin-
tegration test of Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) was employed to investigate the
long-run relationship among the variables, because the test considers both cross-sec-
tional dependence and heterogeneity (Westerlund & Edgerton, 2007). The test also
uses bootstrap simulation to calculate the critical values and bootstrap critical values
are considered when there is cross-sectional dependence. The bootstrap simulation
makes resampling to produce more data given the current data set. The bootstrap
method yields efficient results by reproducing the data around the same average espe-
cially in case of small samples.
The cointegration test of Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) is based on the
McCoskey and Kao (1998) LM test. The model is given in Equation (1) (where
t¼ 1,… ,T (time series) and I¼ 1,… ,N (cross-sectional units)).
yit ¼ /i þ x0itbi þ zit (2)











S2i;t stands for the partial sum of zit , and W
2
i stands for the long-run variances of
disturbance terms (N represents the cross-section dimension, T represents the time
dimension). The major superiorities of the test are that it considers cross-sectional
dependence and allows heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the cointegrating
model and also yields robust results for the small samples. The null hypothesis postu-
lates the existence of a cointegration relation for all cross-sections, and the critical
values are derived from the bootstrap simulation. Finally, bootstrap critical values are
taken in consideration owing to cross-sectional dependence.
The bootstrap Granger causality test of Konya (2006) simultaneously takes notice
of heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. The test is based on seemingly unre-
lated regression (SUR) estimation producing more effective results in the event of
cross-sectional dependence between variables. The statistical significance of causal
relation is examined with bootstrap critical values of the Wald test. Furthermore, the
test does not necessitate any pretests (Konya, 2006).
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Results of cross-sectional dependence and homogeneity tests
The CDLM1 test of Breusch and Pagan (1980) and the LMadj test of Pesaran et al.
(2008) was conducted to investigate the presence of cross-sectional dependence
between the variables and the findings of the test are presented in Table 3. The alter-
native hypothesis postulating the presence of cross-sectional dependence was accepted
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in consequence of test results of cross-sectional dependence. Then we made an infer-
ence about the presence of cross-sectional dependence between the series. In other
words, any shocks in one of the countries in the sample affect the remaining coun-
tries in the sample. Furthermore, the alternative hypothesis about the heterogeneity of
the cointegration coefficients was accepted as a result of the F test.
4.2. Panel unit root test results
The Pesaran (2007) CIPS test was used to investigate whether the series have unit
root or not given existence of cross-sectional dependence. The test findings are shown
in Table 4. The test findings revealed that the variables were not stationary, but
became stationary after taking first differences.
4.3. Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) cointegration test results
The cointegration relation among corruption, rule of law and shadow economy was
examined with the LM cointegration test of Westerlund and Edgerton (2007), and the
findings of the test are shown in Table 5. The bootstrap p values were considered
owing to the presence of cross-sectional dependency and the null hypothesis was
accepted. So there was a cointegrating relationship between corruption, rule of law
and shadow economy. In other words, there was a long-run relationship between the
variables and we can estimate the long-run coefficients at the next stage.
The cointegration coefficients were estimated by fully modified ordinary least
(FMOLS) estimator considering only heterogeneity and dynamic seemingly unrelated
regression (DSUR) simultaneously considering cross-sectional dependence and heter-
ogeneity after determination of the cointegration relationship among the variables
Table 4. Results of Pesaran (2007) CIPS panel unit root test.







Statistically significant at 1%
Source: Authors own elaboration based on the results of panel unit root test




CDLM1 CDLM2 CD LMadj F test
Test stat. Test stat. Test stat. Test stat. Test stat.
SHAD 32.874 (0.014) 7.268 (0.000) –5.629 (0.013) 8.563 (0.000) –
COC 45.021 (0.002) 8.924 (0.000) –3.773 (0.000) 7.552 (0.000) 23.895 (0.001)
ROL 49.543 (0.000) 8.422 (0.001) –6.417 (0.000) 8.386 (0.000) 31.972 (0.023)
Model 51.846 (0.026) 7.568 (0.005) –5.036 (0.018) 5.288 (0.001) –
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the results of homogeneity and cross-sectional dependence tests.
The values in the parentheses indicated the probability values of the results.The model is SHAD¼ f(COC, ROL).
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 1947
and the results are shown in Table 6. The findings of the test revealed that improve-
ments in both corruption and rule of law decreased the size of the shadow economy.
The estimation by the DSUR method indicated that 1 unit increase in COC
(improvement in corruption) led to a 49% of unit decrease in SHAD, whereas estima-
tion by the FMOLS method showed that 1 unit increase in COC (improvement in
corruption) led to a 47% of unit decrease in SHAD. On the other hand, the estima-
tion by DSUR method indicated that 1 unit rise in ROL (legal development) caused a
42% of unit decline in SHAD, whereas estimation by the FMOLS method showed
that 1 unit rise in ROL (legal development) caused a 38% of unit decline in SHAD.
Consequently, both estimators showed that improvement in corruption and rule of
law decreased the size of the shadow economy considerably.
One of the reasons underlying the shadow economy is the presence of corruption.
The employees in a public administration with high rate of corruption are disposed
to be in contact with larger unofficial activities. Furthermore, well-functioning of legal
structure and rule of law deterring the shadow economy, defending property rights
and raising validity of contracts will also decrease the size of the shadow economy.
So, controlling corruption, decreasing the share of th epublic sector in the whole
economy and increasing transparency in the public sector and empowering citizens
have the potential to decrease corruption and, in turn, shadow economy.
Furthermore, a strong law enforcement and surveillance and control mechanism also
contribute to the improvements in the shadow economy directly and indirectly
through the control of corruption.
4.4. Konya (2006) LM bootstrap granger causality test results
The causal interplay between control of corruption, rule of law and shadow economy
was analysed by the bootstrap causality of Konya (2006) given the presence of hetero-
geneity and cross-sectional dependence. The findings of the test are shown in Tables
7 and 8. The results revealed that there was a two-way causality between control of
corruption (COC) and shadow economy (SHAD) in all the cross-section units.
However, there was a two-way causality between rule of law (ROL) and shadow econ-
omy (SHAD) only in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Romania. Furthermore,
Table 5. Panel cointegration test result.
LMþN
Const. Const.þ Trend
Test stat. Asymp. p-value Boot st. p-value Test stat. Asymp. p-value Boot st. p-value
0.743 0.175 0.426 4.998 0.014 0.563
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the results of panel cointegration test.
Bootstrap probability values were produced with 10,000 simulations and asymptotic probability values were pro-
duced from standard normal distribution.
Table 6. Estimation results of cointegrating model.
Dependent variable: SHAD COC ROL
Method Dynamic seemingly unrelated regression –0.496 –0.428
Fully modified ordinary least –0.472 –0.382
 and  denotes that it is respectively significant with 1% and 5%.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the results of cointegrating coefficient estimation.
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there was a one-way causality from ROL to SHAD in Croatia, Estonia, Hungary,
Slovakia and Slovenia.
The results of the causality test also verify the theoretical expectations between cor-
ruption and the shadow economy. In other words, both corruption and shadow econ-
omy are the processes feeding each other in the short run.
5. Conclusion
This article researched the short- and long-run interaction between corruption, rule
of law and shadow economy with panel cointegration and causality test considering
heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. The estimated cointegration coeffi-
cients indicated that improvements in both corruption and rule of law decreased the
shadow economy in the long run. On the other hand, the findings of the panel cau-
sality test revealed a two-way causality between control of corruption and shadow
economy in all cross-section units. However, there was a two-way causality between
rule of law and shadow economy only in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and
Table 7. Konya (2006) bootstrap causality test results for SHAD and COC.
Countries





1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
Bulgaria 23.89 20.64 11.49 7.23 29.63 27.53 14.45 10.26
Croatia 28.56 24.15 11.58 8.06 22.78 26.42 14.37 9.96
Czech Republic 19.67 23.09 12.53 8.53 19.45 32.69 18.89 12.03
Estonia 16.73 24.67 11.61 7.74 27.43 28.96 15.53 10.61
Hungary 15.92 22.42 13.92 8.93 19.34 25.41 12.51 8.56
Latvia 17.03 32.39 15.31 9.16 26.89 29.67 14.28 10.34
Lithuania 15.68 22.80 12.59 8.54 17.45 25.37 12.57 9.39
Poland 17.52 26.61 12.74 7.89 21.83 25.69 11.52 7.03
Romania 28.53 26.38 15.65 9.71 29.62 26.04 15.80 10.24
Slovakia 14.89 20.95 11.42 7.24 17.32 27.81 14.23 10.12
Slovenia 26.98 24.18 12.59 8.16 29.53 26.07 14.36 9.51
, , and  respectively significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the results of panel causality test.
Table 8. Konya (2006) bootstrap causality test results for SHAD and ROL.
Countries





1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
Bulgaria 24.78 32.26 20.73 13.45 23.06 38.14 22.62 15.47
Croatia 6.31 26.16 14.24 9.43 29.45 33.18 17.08 11.69
Czech Republic 29.23 29.08 14.81 9.48 28.64 26.52 18.55 13.09
Estonia 3.78 23.58 15.36 11.34 29.42 33.05 27.35 18.88
Hungary 5.91 17.22 12.57 9.25 18.45 28.60 14.52 9.68
Latvia 4.22 27.33 14.13 9.83 9.42 24.73 23.01 18.40
Lithuania 9.18 35.93 17.75 11.99 7.39 22.97 18.12 11.91
Poland 26.35 32.01 16.34 10.91 32.95 21.93 19.72 13.14
Romania 17.39 27.28 18.43 9.26 29.56 28.38 19.58 13.12
Slovakia 6.17 26.38 14.63 10.31 19.31 28.80 14.11 9.47
Slovenia 7.78 25.67 17.90 9.43 17.48 24.89 13.27 11.87
, , and  respectively significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the results of panel causality test.
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Romania. Furthermore, there was a one-way causality from rule of law and shadow
economy in Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.
In general, the relevant literature has analysed the impact of corruption on the size
of shadow economy with regression analysis and revealed that the improvements in
the corruption decrease the size of shadow economy. Only a few studies (such as
Buehn & Schneider, 2009; Vo et al., 2015) researched the two-way interaction
between corruption and shadow economy and found that corruption and shadow
economy affected each other significantly. Therefore, our findings were found to be
consistent with the general trend in the empirical literature and theoretical expecta-
tions. This study was expected to make a significant contribution to the relevant lim-
ited literature with its method including second generation econometric tests
considering the cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity and its sample (transi-
tion economies of European Union) consisting of the countries having a considerable
social, institutional and economic transformation.
Theoretically, employees in a public administration with a high rate of corruption
are generally disposed to be in contact with larger unofficial activities. Furthermore, a
well-functioning legal structure and rule of law deterring the shadow economy,
defending property rights and raising the validity of contracts, will also decrease the
size of the shadow economy. Our empirical findings verified the theoretical consider-
ations and indicated that there was a significant relationship between shadow econ-
omy, corruption and rule of law in both the short and long runs. So, the
anticorruption policies and improvements in rule of law will contribute to the
decreases in the size of the shadow economy.
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